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Abstract. Defeasible logic is an efficient non-monotonic logic that
is defined only proof-theoretically. It has potential application in
some legal domains. We present here an argumentation semantics for
defeasible logic that will be useful in these applications. Our devel-
opment differs at several points from existing argumentation frame-
works since there are several features of defeasible logic that have
not been addressed in the literature.
1 Introduction
Defeasible logic (DL) is a practical non-monotonic logic. This logic,
and similar logics, have been proposed as the appropriate language
for executable regulations [4], contracts [22], and business rules [13].
There are several implementations of DL, each of which is capable
of handling 100,000’s of rules [5].
Although DL can be described informally in terms of arguments,
the logic has been formalized in a proof-theoretic setting in which ar-
guments play no role. In this paper we will provide an argumentation-
theoretic semantics for DL.
There are already several different abstract argumentation frame-
works [10, 8, 15, 20, 23, 24]. However, DL provides several chal-
lenges that have not yet been addressed by this work:
(1) DL has a “directly sceptical” semantics, in the sense of Horty
[14], also called “conservative” in Wagner’s classification [25]. Most
argumentation-theoretic approaches provide sceptical semantics as
the common part of credulous semantics, and so do not address this
sort of scepticism. (2) DL provides three different kinds of rule, in-
cluding a rule that cannot support an argument, only defeat one. Most
argumentation-theoretic works have addressed a single kind of rule.
(3) In DL, positive conclusions (that a proposition can be proved)
are not the only consideration; negative conclusions (that a propo-
sition cannot be proved) are of equal significance. (4) DL exhibits
“team defeat” [12], in which one collection of arguments may defeat
another, although no single argument defeats every argument in the
other collection.
Technically, the main modifications we make to conventional
argumentation-theoretic frameworks are: the explicit introduction of
infinite arguments, the treatment of teams of arguments, rather than
considering each argument only individually, and an iterative defini-
tion of rejected arguments.
In addition to innovations we make in argument theory, the re-
sulting argumentation-theoretic semantics will be advantageous for
DL. The logic currently has no model theory, and the proof theory
is clumsy. The semantics we provide is considerably more elegant.
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It will prove useful in the intended applications of DL mentioned
above, where arguments are a natural feature of the problem domain.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide
a brief introduction to DL. In this short paper there is no room for
full details; for those we refer the reader to [17]. We then provide our
argumentation-theoretic semantics for DL in Section 3. We conclude
with a discussion of related work.
2 Overview of Defeasible Logic
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of DL. A defeasible
theory contains five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules,
defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation. We consider
only essentially propositional rules. Rules containing free variables
are interpreted as the set of their variable-free instances.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Tweety is an
emu”. In the logic, this might be expressed as emu(tweety).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises
are indisputable (e.g. facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of
a strict rule is “Emus are birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence.
An example of such a rule is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ f lies(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may
conclude that it flies, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it
may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions.
Their only use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they
are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the
contrary. An example is “If an animal is heavy then it might not be
able to fly”. Formally:
heavy(X); ¬ f lies(X).
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence
that the animal may not be able to fly. In other words, we don’t wish
to conclude ¬ f lies if heavy, we simply want to prevent a conclusion
f lies.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities
among rules, that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of
another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : bird ⇒ f lies
r′ : brokenWing ⇒¬ f lies
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made
about whether a bird with a broken wing can fly. But if we introduce
a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude that
the bird cannot fly. The superiority relation is required to be acyclic.
It turns out that we only need to define the superiority relation over
rules with contradictory conclusions.
It is not possible in this short paper to give a complete formal
description of the logic. However, we hope to give enough informa-
tion about the logic to make the discussion intelligible. We refer the
reader to [19, 7, 17] for more thorough treatments.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) which is a finite
set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head) C(r) which is
a literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules
in R by Rs, the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set
of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the set of defeaters in R by Rd f t .
R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q. If q is a literal,
∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of
facts, R a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the fol-
lowing four forms:
+∆q, which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D
(i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not
definitely provable in D.
+∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not
defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in
D=(F,R,>). A derivation is a finite sequence P=(P(1), . . .P(n)) of
tagged literals satisfying four conditions (which correspond to infer-
ence rules for each of the four kinds of conclusion). Here we briefly
state the condition for positive defeasible conclusions [7]. (P(1..i)
denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i):
+∂: If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆ ∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and t > s
Let us work through this condition. To show that q is provable de-
feasibly we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely
provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part of D as
well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or defeasible
rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to con-
sider possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of ∼q.
To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that ∼ q
is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set
of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have
head ∼ q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they
could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in line with the
motivation of defeaters given earlier). Essentially each such rule s at-
tacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such rule s must be
counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following properties:
(i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than
s. Thus each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by
a stronger rule. In other words, r and the rules t form a team (for q)
that defeats the rules s.
3 Argumentation for Defeasible Logic
Arumentation systems usually contain the following basic elements:
an underlying logical language, and the definitions of: argument,
conflict between arguments, and the status of arguments. The latter
elements are often used to define a consequence relation. In what fol-
lows we present an argumentation system containing the above ele-
ments in a way appropriate for DL. Obviously, the underlying logical
language we use is the language of DL; however, we consider facts
to be strict rules with empty bodies.
Arguments are often defined to be either proof trees or monotonic
derivations in the underlying logic. However, DL requires a more re-
fined definition: as we have seen in the previous section, rules form
teams to support conclusions. Thus we extend the simpler notion of
argument and we allow arguments to be sets of proof trees (see ex-
ample 2 for a more detailed explanation). DL also requires a more
general notion of proof tree that admits infinite trees, so that the dis-
tinction is kept between an unrefuted, but infinite, chain of reasoning
and a refuted chain.
A proof tree for a literal p based on a set of rules R is a (possi-
bly infinite) tree with nodes labelled by literals such that the root is
labelled by p and for every node h:
• If b1, . . . ,bn label the children of h then there is a ground instance
of a rule in R with body b1, . . . ,bn and head h.
• If, in addition, h is not the root of the tree then the rule must be a
strict or defeasible rule.
The arcs in a proof tree is labelled by the rules used to obtain them.
If the rule at the root of a proof tree is strict or defeasible and
the proof tree is finite we say it is a supportive proof tree. If all the
rules in a proof tree are strict then we say that it is a strict proof tree.
As we shall see shortly, proof trees are only indirectly related to DL
derivations.
An argument for a literal p is a set of proof trees for p. We write
r ∈ A to denote that rule r is used in a proof tree in argument A. A
(proper) subargument of an argument A is a subtree of a proof tree
in A. We say that an argument A is finite if every proof tree in A is
finite. An argument A is strict if every proof tree in A is strict. If
an argument is not strict it is defeasible. An argument A for p is a
supportive argument if every proof tree for p in it is supportive.
DL has three kinds of rules and only two of them can be used
to support the derivation of a conclusion. Defeaters can only block
derivations. Intuitively a supportive argument is an argument from
which a conclusion can be drawn, but if we changed its definition,
replacing “every” with “some”, then we would have the following
scenario: let A and B be, respectively, the arguments {r1 : ⇒ p,r2 :
; p} and {r3 : ⇒ ¬p} where r1 < r3 and r3 < r2. A would be a
supportive argument, and its conclusion, p, derivable, but DL is not
able to derive +∂p.
An argument is based on an ordered theory (R,<) if every rule in
the argument is a ground instance of a rule in R. Clearly, a defeasi-
ble theory (F,R,<) can be considered an ordered theory (F ∪R,<).
ArgsP is the set of arguments based on the ordered theory P.
At this stage we can characterize the definite conclusions of DL in
argumentation-theoretic terms.
Proposition 1 Let P be a defeasible theory and p be a literal.
• P `+∆p iff there is a strict supportive argument for p in ArgsP
• P ` −∆p iff there is no (finite or infinite) strict argument for p in
ArgsP
This characterization is straightforward, since strict rules are the
monotonic subset of DL. Characterizing defeasible provability re-
quires more definitions.
An argument A attacks an argument B if a conclusion of A is the
complement of a conclusion of B.
An argument A defeats a defeasible argument B at q if there exists
rA ∈ A and rB ∈ B with conclusions ∼q and q, respectively, such that
rA 6< rB. A set of arguments S defeats a defeasible argument B if there
is A ∈ S that defeats B.
Example 1 Let D be a defeasible theory containing the rules
r1 : a ⇒ p
r2 : p ⇒ q
r3 : b ⇒¬p
r4 : ¬p ⇒¬q
the facts a,b, and the superiority relation is r4 < r2. We consider the
arguments
A : a ⇒ p ⇒ q
B : b ⇒ ¬p ⇒ ¬q
A defeats B both at ¬p, because r4 < r2, and at ¬q, because there
is no superiority relation between r1 and r3. B defeats A at p for the
same reason A defeats B at ¬p. 2
An argument A team defeats a defeasible argument B at q if for every
rB ∈ B with conclusion q there exists a supportive rule rA ∈ A with
conclusion ∼q such that rB < rA.
Example 2 Let D be a defeasible theory containing the rules
r1 : a1 ⇒ p
r2 : a2 ⇒ p
r3 : b1 ⇒¬p
r4 : b2 ⇒¬p
the facts a1, a2, b1, b2, and the superiority relation is r3 < r1, r4 <





containing two proof trees. Ap team defeats:
• the argument B1 : b1 ⇒¬p since r3 < r1;
• the argument B2 : b2 ⇒¬p since r4 < r2;




⇒ ¬p since r3 < r1 and r4 < r2.
2
Example 3 Some explanation is due to justify the exclusion of ar-
guments ending with a defeaters from the notion of team defeat (see
also the comment about supportive arguments above). First of all one
of the main aims of such a notion is to help establishing conclusive
arguments (that is, arguments that can be used to draw positive con-
clusions). Let us consider a defeasible theory D′ obtained from the
defeasible theory of example 2 by replacing the rule r2 by the de-






Since A contains a defeater, it cannot team defeat the argument B3 of
the previous example. Let us compare this situation with the defini-
tion of +∂. r2 cannot be used to derive p: it is a defeater. On the other
hand r1 could be used to derive p if there is no applicable rule for ¬p.
But, in this case, we have r3 and r4, and, when r4 is applicable, we
have a conflict between r1 and r4. However, p could be reinstated if
there is an applicable supportive rule stronger than r4 (2.3.2), but in
this case the only rule stronger than r4 is the defeater r2, and so p
cannot be concluded from r1 and r2. 2
An argument A is supported by a set of arguments S if every conclu-
sion in A is also the conclusion of a supportive argument in S.
In an ordered theory P, let strongP(S) be the set of arguments of
P, all of whose proper subarguments are supported by S. Obviously
S⊆ strongP(S). Also note that, if A1,A2 ∈ strongP(S) are arguments
for a literal q, then A1 ∪A2 ∈ strongP(S). Thus there is a maximal
argument for q in strongP(S), which we denote by max(q,S). A de-
feasible argument A is undercut by a set of arguments S if there is a
literal q such that strongP(S) defeats a proper subargument of A at q,
and A does not team defeat max(¬q,S) at ¬q.
Example 4 We consider again the defeasible theory D of example
1. Let S = {a,b} be a set of arguments. The argument
A : a ⇒ p ⇒ q
is undercut by S since the argument B : b ⇒ ¬p is in strongD(S)
and it is the maximal argument for ¬p. Moreover B defeats a proper
subargument of A at p, but it is not team defeated by A at p. 2
That an argument A is undercut by S means that we can show that
some premises of A cannot be proved if we accept the arguments in
S; the next example explains the reason for the use of team defeat in
the definition of undercut.
Example 5 Let D′ be the defeasible theory obtained from the de-
feasible theory of example 2 by adding the rule p ⇒ q. And let




⇒ p ⇒ q
Notice that each of the arguments B1, B2, and B3 of example 2 de-
feats A at p, but A is not undercut by S at p since the argument A
team defeats the max(¬p,S) in strongD′(S). Here max(¬p,S) is the
argument B3 of example 2. Thus team defeat in the definition of un-
dercut is necessary to be consistent with the use of team defeat at the
top level of arguments. 2
It is worth noting that the above definitions concern only defeasi-
ble arguments; for strict arguments we stipulate that they cannot be
undercut or defeated.
An argument A for p is acceptable w.r.t a set of arguments S if
1 A is strict, or
2a every proper subargument of A is supported by S, and
2b every argument attacking A is either undercut by S or team de-
feated by A.
Let P be an ordered theory. We define JPi as follows.
• JP0 = /0
• JPi+1 = {a ∈ ArgsP | a is acceptable w.r.t. JPi }
The set of justified arguments in an ordered theory P is JArgsP =
∪∞i=1JPi . A literal p is justified if it is the conclusion of a supportive
argument in JArgP
Theorem 2 Let P be a defeasible theory. Let p be a literal.
P `+∂p iff p is justified.
This theorem provides a characterization of positive defeasible
conclusions in DL by means of justified arguments.
Example 6 Given the theory D′ of example 5, JD′1 = {a1,a2,b1,b2},
and the argument Ap of example 2 is in JD
′
2 , since it is acceptable
w.r.t. JD′1 : every proper subargument is supported, and the attacking
arguments are team defeated. At this point it is immediate to see that
the argument Aq of example 5 is in JD
′
3 . Moreover JArgsD′ = J
D′
3 . 2
That an argument A is justified means that it resists every reason-
able refutation. However, DL is more expressive since it is able to say
when a conclusion is demonstrably non provable (−∂). Briefly, that
a conclusion is demonstrably non provable means that every possi-
ble conclusive argument has been refuted. In the following we show
how to capture this notion in our argumentation system by assigning
the status rejected to arguments that are refuted. Roughly speaking,
an argument is rejected if it has a rejected subargument or it cannot
overcome an attack from a justified argument.
An argument A is rejected by sets of arguments S and T when
1 A is not strict, and either
2a a proper subargument of A is in S, or
2b there exists an argument B attacking A, such that: B is supported
by T , and A does not team defeat B.
We define RPi as follows.
• RP0 = /0
• RPi+1 = {a ∈ ArgsP | a is rejected by RPi and JArgsP}
The set of rejected arguments in an ordered theory P is RArgsP =
∪∞i=1RPi . A literal p is rejected if there is no argument in ArgsP −
RArgsP that ends with a supportive rule for p.
Theorem 3 Let P be a defeasible theory. Let p be a literal.
P ` −∂p iff p is rejected.
Example 7 The following DL theory illustrates why RArgsP needs
to be constructed iteratively, even after all the justified literals have
been identified.
There are the following rules, for i = 1, . . . ,n:
true ⇒ bi ai ⇒ ¬bi
bi−1 ⇒ ai true ⇒ ¬ai
and the fact b0. The superiority relation is empty.
This theory produces the following conclusions:
−∂ai,−∂¬ai,+∂bi,−∂¬bi, for i = 0, . . . ,n.
The arguments defined by this theory are, for each i :
Ai : true ⇒ ¬ai
Bi : true ⇒ bi−1 ⇒ ai ⇒ ¬bi
and their subarguments. Notice that
• each argument Ai is attacked by Bi at ai.
• each argument Bi is attacked by Bi−1 at bi−1.
Eventually, both Ai and Bi will be rejected, since neither can team
defeat the other, but this cannot be done until the status of bi−1 is
determined. As noted above, this depends on Bi−1. Thus the situation
incorporates some sequentiality, where Bi−1 must be resolved before
resolving Bi, and this suggests that a characterization of RArgsP must
be iterative, even after all the justified literals have been identified. 2
We conclude this section with examples demonstrating how two
traditionally problematic features of argumentation are handled by
our semantics.
Example 8 (Self-defeating arguments) In this example we show
how our framework deals with the so called self-defeating arguments.
Consider the defeasible theory with no facts, an empty superiority re-
lation and the following rules:
true ⇒ p p ⇒¬p
This defeasible theory produces the following conclusion−∂¬p. The
arguments that can be built from the theory are:
A1 : true ⇒ p
A2 : true ⇒ p ⇒ ¬p
Here A2 is a self-defeating argument. Since the superiority relation is
empty there is no team defeat. A1, although supported by JP0 , is not
acceptable in JP0 since there is an attacking argument, A2, which is
not undercut by JP0 : no proper subargument of A2 is defeated by an
argument supported by JP0 . For the same reason A2 is not acceptable
in JP0 . Consequently JP1 = JP0 , and therefore JArgP is empty. Further-
more, A2 ∈ RArgP. The reason why A2 is rejected is the following:
although A1 is not justified, it is supported by JArgsP, and so it can
be used to stop the validity of another argument, since we have no
means of deciding which one is to be preferred. On the other hand,
A1 cannot be rejected since the argument attacking it (A2) is not sup-
ported by JArgsP: as we have already seen true⇒ p is not a justified
argument. 2
Example 9 (Circular arguments) Here we examine circular argu-
ments. Very often circular arguments are not considered to be true
arguments since they represent a very well known fallacy, and they
are excluded from the set of arguments using syntactical definitions.
Briefly an argument is circular if a conclusion depends on itself as a
premise.
In our approach, circular arguments correspond to infinite argu-
ments, and they are not justified. At the same time, however, they are
not automatically rejected. Moreover, such an argument can be used
to attack (and defeat) other arguments.
Let us first consider the defeasible theory D1 consisting of the
rules
p ⇒ q q ⇒ p
It is immediate to see that the only possible arguments here are the
infinite arguments
A1 . . . p ⇒ q ⇒ p ⇒ q
A2 . . . q ⇒ p ⇒ q ⇒ p
They are not justified since no proper subargument is justified, and
they are not rejected since no proper subargument is rejected and
there is no argument attacking them.
The meaning of the theory at hand is that if p then normally q, and
if q then normally p. Thus this amounts to say that normally p and q
are equivalent. We add to D1 the following rules:
q ⇒ r true ⇒¬r
obtaining the defeasible theory D2. In this scenario each argument
for r is infinite, circular, and rejected since there is a supported argu-
ment for ¬r. However, the argument A3 : true ⇒¬r is not justified,
since each argument for r attacks it and is not undercut (no argument
attacks a proper subargument of an argument for r).
Finally D3 is obtained from D2 by adding the rule true ⇒ ¬p.
Now A3 becomes justified since, trivially, the argument A4 : true⇒ p
is supported by JD30 , A3 attacks A2, and therefore each argument for
r is undercut. 2
4 Related Works
[16] proposes an abstract defeasible reasoning framework that is
achieved by mapping elements of defeasible reasoning into the de-
fault reasoning framework of [8]. While this framework is suitable
for developing new defeasible reasoning languages, it is not appro-
priate for characterizing DL because:
• [16, 8] do not address direct scepticism.
• [8] does not address Kunen’s semantics of logic programs which
provides a characterization of failure-to-prove in DL [18].
• The correctness of the mapping needs to be established if [16] is
to be applied to an existing language like DL. In fact the repre-
sentation of priorities is inappropriate for DL, although results of
[3, 1] might be adapted to remedy this point.
The abstract argumentation framework of [24] addresses both strict
and defeasible rules, but not defeaters. However, the treatment of
strict rules in defeasible arguments is different from that of DL, and
there is no concept of team defeat. There are structural similarities
between the definitions of inductive warrant and warrant in [24] and
JPi and JArgsP, but they differ in that acceptability is monotonic in
S whereas the corresponding definitions in [24] are antitone. The se-
mantics that results is not sceptical, and more related to stable se-
mantics than Kunen semantics. The framework does have a notion of
ultimately defeated argument similar to our rejected arguments, but
the definition is not iterative, possibly because the framework does
not have a directly sceptical semantics.
Prakken and Sartor [21, 20], motivated by legal reasoning, have
proposed an argumentation system that combines the language of ex-
tended logic programming with a well-founded semantics. The use of
this semantics makes Prakken and Sartor’s system not directly scep-
tical. It is worth noting that our definition of defeat is the same as that
of rebut in [21, 20], but the systems differ on the notion of accept-
ability of arguments. Moreover, Prakken and Sartor do not address
the question of teams of rules.
On the other hand Simari and Loui’s system [23] deals with teams
of arguments/rules but it is characterized by Dung’s grounded se-
mantics, which corresponds to an ambiguity propagating variant of
DL (see [2, 11]).
Among other contributions, [9] provides a sceptical argumenta-
tion theoretic semantics and shows that LPwNF – which is weaker,
but very similar to DL [6] – is sound with respect to this semantics.
However, both LPwNF and DL are not complete with respect to this
semantics.
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